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Abstract
We compare the performance of BB84 and SARG04, the later of which was proposed by
V. Scarani et al., in Phys. Rev. Lett. 92, 057901 (2004). Specifically, in this paper, we in-
vestigate SARG04 with two-way classical communications and SARG04 with decoy states. In the
first part of the paper, we show that SARG04 with two-way communications can tolerate a higher
bit error rate (19.4% for a one-photon source and 6.56% for a two-photon source) than SARG04
with one-way communications (10.95% for a one-photon source and 2.71% for a two-photon source).
Also, the upper bounds on the bit error rate for SARG04 with two-way communications are com-
puted in a closed form by considering an individual attack based on a general measurement. In the
second part of the paper, we propose employing the idea of decoy states in SARG04 to obtain un-
conditional security even when realistic devices are used. We compare the performance of SARG04
with decoy states and BB84 with decoy states. We find that the optimal mean-photon number
for SARG04 is higher than that of BB84 when the bit error rate is small. Also, we observe that
SARG04 does not achieve a longer secure distance and a higher key generation rate than BB84,
assuming a typical experimental parameter set.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd
∗Electronic address: cffung@comm.utoronto.ca
†Electronic address: ktamaki@physics.utoronto.ca
‡Electronic address: hklo@comm.utoronto.ca
1
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2] provides a way for two parties to expand a secure
key that they initially share. The best known QKD is the BB84 protocol published by
Bennett and Brassard in 1984 [1]. The BB84 protocol consists of two phases, the quantum
transmission phase and the classical communication phase. In the quantum phase, one of
the two legitimate parties, Alice, sends quantum states to the other legitimate party, Bob.
The quantum states received by Bob are converted to classical bits by measurements. In
the classical communication phase, both parties discuss which bits to keep or discard. They
sacrifice some bits to test the error rate on the bit string. If the error rate is too high, they
abort the protocol. For states that are retained, they perform bit error correction with the
help of classical communications. After that, Alice and Bob’s bit strings are the same, but
some information on them might have leaked to a potential eavesdropper, Eve. To remove
Eve’s information, they apply privacy amplification to distill the final secret key.
The security of BB84 was not proved until many years after its introduction. Among the
proofs [3, 4, 5, 6], the one by Shor and Preskill [6] is relevant to this paper. Their simple
proof essentially converts an entanglement distillation protocol (EDP)-based QKD proposed
by Lo and Chau [5] to the BB84 protocol. The EDP-based QKD has already been shown
to be secure by [5] and the conversion successively leads to the security of BB84.
Security proofs of QKD protocols were further extended to explicitly accommodate the
imperfection in practical devices [7, 8]. One important imperfection is that the laser sources
used in practice are coherent sources that occasionally emit more than one photon in each
signal. Thus, they are not single-photon sources that the other security proofs [3, 4, 6] of
BB84 assumed. In particular, BB84 may become insecure when coherent sources with strong
intensity are used. For instance, Eve can launch an photon-number-splitting (PNS) attack,
in which she blocks all single-photon pulses and splits multi-photon pulses. She keeps one
copy of each of the split pulses to herself and forwards another copy to Bob. Although [7, 8]
showed that secure QKD is still possible even with imperfect devices, the PNS attack puts
severe limits on the distance and the key generation rate of unconditionally secure QKD.
A novel solution to the problem of imperfect devices in BB84 was proposed by Hwang [9],
which uses extra test states–called the decoy states–to learn the properties of the channel
and/or eavesdropping on the key-generating signal states. Our group presented an uncon-
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ditional security proof of decoy-state QKD [10, 11]. By combining the GLLP (Gottesman,
Lo, Lu¨kenhaus, and Preskill) [7] result with the decoy state idea [9], we showed that decoy
state QKD can exhibit dramatic increase in distance and key generation rate compared to
non-decoy protocols. Moreover, our group proposed the idea of using the vacua or very weak
coherent states as decoy states [11]. Subsequently, practical protocols for QKD using a few
decoy states were analyzed by Wang [12, 13], by our group [14], and by Harrington [15],
thereby making the decoy idea more practical. The first experimental implementation of
a QKD using one decoy state was demonstrated by our group [16]. Also, a decoy method
using two-way classical communications was proposed by our group [17].
Another attempt to combat PNS attacks was by Scarani et al. [18] , who introduced a new
protocol, called SARG04, which is very similar to the BB84 protocol. The quantum state
transmission phase and the measurement phase of SARG04 are the same as that of BB84, as
both use the same four quantum states and the same experimental measurement. The only
difference between the two protocols is the classical post-processing phase. Interestingly,
with only a change in the post-processing phase, the protocol becomes secure even when
Alice emits two photons, a situation under which BB84 is insecure. This was proved by two
of us [19], who also proved the security of SARG04 with a single-photon source. Specifically,
we provided lower bounds of the bit error rate when one-way classical communications are
used in the error correction and privacy amplification phases. We also proposed a modified
SARG04 protocol that uses the same six states as the original six-state protocol [20, 21].
The security of SARG04 with a single-photon source was also proved by Branciard et al. [22].
They considered SARG04 implemented with single-photon sources and with realistic sources.
For the single-photon-source case, they provided upper and lower bounds of the bit error
rate with one-way classical communications. For the realistic-source case, they considered
only incoherent attack by Eve and showed that SARG04 can achieve a higher secret key
rate and a greater secure distance than BB84. The SARG04 protocol was generalized by
Koashi [23] to the case of N quantum states. Another protocol that is similar to SARG04
is the B92 protocol [24], which uses two nonorthogonal quantum states. The security of
B92 with a single-photon source was proved by Tamaki et al. [25, 26]. On the other hand,
Koashi [27] proposed an implementation of B92 with strong phase-reference coherent light
that was proved secure.
The fact that a modification to the classical communication part (from BB84 to SARG04)
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changes the foundation of security, i.e. making two-photon signals secure, is interesting. Note
that since the difference between BB84 and SARG04 is only in the classical data processing
part, it is not difficult to perform SARG04 once the experiment of BB84 is available. Thus, it
is important to investigate the performance of SARG04 in order to determine which protocol
one should perform. This is our main motivation.
In this paper, we make an endeavour to study this interesting SARG04 protocol, but in
different situations than that considered in [19, 23] and [22], and thus complementing their
results. Specifically, we provide upper and lower bounds of the bit error rate with two-way
classical communications for single-photon sources and for two-photon sources. Also, we
consider implementations with realistic devices using decoy states with one-way classical
communications. Here, we allow the most general attack by Eve and study the key rate
and distance properties of SARG04 in comparison with BB84. Interestingly, under our
most general attack assumption which was not considered in [22], we observe a different
phenomenon than [22], that SARG04 has a lower key rate and a shorter secure distance
than BB84. However, our result shows that SARG04 is interestingly different from BB84 in
one aspect in the realistic setting. It is that the optimal mean photon number for SARG04
is higher than that for BB84, when the detector error probability is low. This is because
when the bit error rate gets smaller, the two-photon contribution to the key generation rate
gets higher.
This paper makes use of two important existing techniques: QKD with two-way classical
communications and the decoy-state method. QKD with two-way communications in the
error correction and privacy amplification phases was first proposed by Gottesman and
Lo [28] as a method to achieve a higher tolerable bit error rate; this method was later
improved by Chau [29] to further increase the tolerable bit error rate of a six-state scheme.
The essence of QKD with two-way communications is that, by allowing Alice and Bob to
communicate with each other, the qubits transmitted by Alice to Bob can be separated
into two groups, one with a higher bit error rate than the other. Thus, through two-
way communications, they can discard the group with the higher bit error rate and retain
the other group for further bit error correction and privacy amplification. Intuitively, a
QKD utilizing two-way communications should be superior to the case when only one-way
communications are used. This was shown to be true for BB84 in [28]. Here, we will
show that this is also true for SARG04 for both single- and two-photon parts. Especially
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TABLE I: Summary of results for SARG04. The numbers marked with † are the results of this
paper. The bounds on the secure distance are specific for the experimental parameters from the
Gobby-Yuan-Shields (GYS) experiment [30].
Bit error rate of SARG04 with single-photon source
one-way two-way
Upper bound 14.9% [22] 1/3†
Lower bound 9.68% [19, 22] and 10.95% (with preprocessing) [22] 19.9%†
Bit error rate of SARG04 with two-photon source
one-way two-way
Upper bound N/A 22.56%†
Lower bound 2.71% [19] 6.56%†
Secure distance using decoy states with realistic source
BB84 SARG04
Upper bound 207.7 km [10] 207.7 km†
Lower bound 141.8 km [10] 97.2 km†
for single-photon SARG04, we show that the lower bound with two-way communications
is higher than the upper bound with one-way communications provided in [22]. When we
analyze the security of SARG04 with realistic devices, we will use the decoy-state method
of [10] in order to achieve a long secure distance.
We have tabulated the results of this paper on bounds of bit error rate and secure distance,
along with known results, in Table.I. The six numbers on the right column are results of
this paper, while existing results are cited on the left column. The bounds on the secure
distance listed are specific for the experimental parameters from the Gobby-Yuan-Shields
(GYS) experiment [30].
The organization of the paper is as follows: We first review some existing techniques for
the security proof in Section II, which provide a basis for the development of the results of this
paper. In Section III, we summarize the assumptions we make in this paper. In Section IV,
we develop a SARG04 protocol with two-way classical communications with one- and two-
photon sources. In Section V, we consider SARG04 in a realistic setting, where imperfect
laser sources and detectors are used. Finally, concluding remarks are provided in Section VI.
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We note that an independent work on SARG04 with decoy states was also studied in [31].
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we review some bases for the security proof in this paper. First, we
briefly review an entanglement distillation protocol (EDP) and its relation with the security
of QKD, where we especially review the security proof of BB84 by Shor and Preskill [6].
Secondly, we explain how SARG04 works, and we construct an EDP protocol that is equiv-
alent to SARG04 protocol. We furthermore mention the property of the density matrix in
the EDP protocol for the later convenience. Thirdly, we explain the key generation rate
for BB84 and SARG04, assuming realistic devices and one-way classical communications.
Next, we describe the decoy method in BB84 and SARG04. Finally, we review QKD with
two-way classical communications.
A. EDP and its relation with QKD
1. EDP
The goal of an entanglement distillation protocol (EDP) is to distill nearly perfect EPR
pairs from noisy EPR pairs initially shared between two distant parties, Alice and Bob. Any
bipartite density matrix describing Alice and Bob’s qubit system, ρ, can be expressed in the
Bell basis, which is composed of the four orthogonal Bell states:
|Φ±〉 = (|00〉 ± |11〉)/
√
2
|Ψ±〉 = (|01〉 ± |10〉)/
√
2.
(1)
Taking |Φ+〉 as the reference state, the diagonal of ρ in the Bell basis
pI , 〈Φ+| ρ |Φ+〉
pX , 〈Φ−| ρ |Φ−〉
pZ , 〈Ψ+| ρ |Ψ+〉
pY , 〈Ψ−| ρ |Ψ−〉
(2)
represent the probabilities of applying, respectively, the Pauli I, X, Z, and Y operators
to the either one of the qubits of the bipartite system. In the view of an EDP, a pool of
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|Φ+〉AB state is prepared by Alice. She keeps system A of every pair and sends system
B of every pair to Bob. Due to the presence of noise in the quantum channel, system B
may undergo bit and/or phase flip errors and the probabilities of the various types of errors
are represented by pI (no error), pX (bit flip error), pZ (phase flip error), and pY (bit and
phase flip error). In the paper by Bennett, DiVincenzo, Smolin, and Wootters (BDSW) [32],
they assume that all of the pairs are described by the same density matrix, and the job of
an EDP is to correct the errors using only local operations and classical communications
(LOCCs), leaving Alice and Bob with a pool of |Φ+〉AB states. Several methods of EDP’s
were proposed in BDSW [32] including the hashing method and the recurrence method.
Many of these methods assume that the initial density matrix ρ is Bell-diagonal.
2. EDP-based QKD protocol
EDP’s are closely related to QKD protocols. The connection between them is that if
Alice and Bob share almost perfect EPR pairs that are pure, then the pairs are almost
unentangled with Eve’s system. Thus, the information leaked to Eve is negligible, and they
can obtain an unconditionally secure key by measuring the EPR pairs. Thus, the purpose
of a QKD protocol can be viewed as a procedure for Alice and Bob to share almost perfect
EPR pairs, which is the purpose of an EDP. In order to run an EDP, they need to know
the error rates on the noisy EPR pairs and the job of the error rate estimation is the first
part of a QKD protocol. After the error rates are upper bounded, the second part of the
QKD involves running an EDP to distill almost perfect EPR pairs. In essence, a QKD can
be regarded as consisting of an error rate estimation part and an EDP part. Note that the
eavesdropping attack by Eve who has read/write access to the quantum channel appears to
Alice and Bob as noise of the channel.
An EDP-based QKD using quantum computers was proposed by [5] and a modified
version of it [6] (shown in Fig. 1) is as follows: Alice prepares N EPR pairs |Ψ〉AiBi =
(|0z〉Ai |0z〉Bi + |1z〉Ai |1z〉B1)/
√
2, for i ∈ [1, N ]. She randomly chooses whether to apply a
Hadamard gate H on system B (i.e. ki = 0, 1) before sending it to Bob through Eve. Eve
may perform the most general attack on all Bob’s qubits. Bob randomly chooses whether to
apply the Hadamard. They discard the EPR pairs to which Alice and Bob apply different
operations. Alice and Bob choose some of the EPR pairs as test qubits. They measure the
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FIG. 1: An EDP version of the BB84 protocol. Shor and Preskill [6] showed that it can be
reduced to BB84. Note that only the EPR pairs to which Alice and Bob apply the same rotations
are shown; EPR pairs with different rotations are discarded.
test qubits in the Z basis and compare the measurement results publicly to estimate the
bit error rate of the test qubits. The random sampling theorem then asserts that the rest
of the untested qubits (code bits) have asymptotically the same bit error rates as the test
bits with high probability. Since the bit errors and the phase errors are symmetrized by the
random Hadamard gate on Bob’s qubits, the phase error rate on code bits is asymptotically
equal to the bit error rate on code bits, i.e. for BB84
ep = eb. (3)
Once Alice and Bob know the good estimates the error rates, they can each obtain the bit
and phase error syndromes using quantum computers. Alice then sends her syndromes to
Bob who will then correct his qubits by applying Z and X operations so that his syndromes
match Alice’s syndromes. After the successful distillation, they now share EPR pairs that
have high fidelity with the pure state |Φ+〉⊗MAB (where M is the number of the EPR pairs
Alice and Bob share). They each measure their halves of the pair in the Z basis to produce
a common secure key on which Eve has negligible information.
We can associate the four probabilities pI , pX , pZ , pY with two (dependent) binary random
variables, X and Z, which represent the bit and phase errors, respectively. With this
notation, the uncertainty in the bit flip error is H(X) = H2(pX + pY ) and in the phase flip
error is H(Z) = H2(pZ + pY ), where H2(p) = −p log2(p)− (1− p) log2(1− p) is the binary
entropy function. The mutual information between the bit and phase errors is I(X;Z) =
8
H(X)−H(X|Z).
The key generation rate of the EDP-based QKD using one-way classical communications
is [32]
R = 1−H(X,Z) (4)
= 1−H(X)−H(Z|X). (5)
The second term in the last equation is concerned with the number of rounds of random
hashing for determining the bit error patterns, and the third term is concerned with the
number of rounds of random hashing for determining the phase error patterns given that
the bit error patterns are known. One drawback with the EDP-based QKD is that it requires
the preparation of EPR pairs and the use of quantum memory and computers, which are
challenging to implement in practice in the near future. Thus, it is more desirable to use
prepare-and-measure QKD protocols, in which Alice only needs to prepare qubits and send
them to Bob, and Bob only needs to measure them immediately after receiving them; no
quantum memory and quantum computers are needed.
3. BB84 protocol
In Shor and Preskill’s proof [6], they showed that the EDP-based QKD can be reduced to
BB84, a prepare-and-measure protocol that does not require the use of quantum computers.
Their proof relies on the use of CSS codes to decouple the bit error correction and the
phase error correction. They showed that phase error correction is not necessary; as long
as phase error correction could have been performed, the protocol is secure. Thus, the phase
error correction step with quantum decoding is replaced by a privacy amplification step
where classical bits of the raw key are XOR’ed to form the final key. Since the phase
error correction step is removed, Bob’s final Z measurement in the EDP-based QKD can be
moved to before the bit error correction step. Here, note that all of the hashing for the bit
error correction is in the Z basis, which commutes with Bob’s final Z measurements. Only
one-way communications are needed in the bit error correction step in Shor-Preskill’s proof.
This is because Alice and Bob both compute the bit error syndromes but only Alice sends
her syndromes to Bob. Bob then applies the appropriate bit-flip operations on his bit string
so as to match his syndromes with Alice’s syndromes. Using Eq. (5), the key generation
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rate of the BB84 protocol resulting from the use of CSS codes is
R = 1−H(X)− (H(Z)− I(Z;X)) (6)
= 1−H2(eb)−H2(ep) + I(Z;X) (7)
where eb = pX + pY is the bit error rate and ep = pZ + pY is the phase error rate. The bit
error rate eb is estimated in BB84 through public communications between Alice and Bob.
It is important to note that the phase error rate ep can be estimated from eb using Eq. (3).
The mutual information term in Eq. (7) can be determined by pX , pY , pZ . However, only
eb = pX + pY and ep = pZ + pY are known and pY is not known. Thus, we consider the
worst-case value of pY (which corresponds to having no mutual information between bit
and phase errors) to find the worst-case value of the key generation rate. In the worst-case
scenario, the highest tolerable bit error rate can be found by solving 1 = 2H2(eb). This gives
eb = 11.0% [6], at which the key generation rate is zero.
B. The SARG04 protocol
In this paper, we consider the SARG04 protocol [18], which is a prepare-and-measure
protocol. In fact, the quantum phase of SARG04 is the same as that of BB84; so it can
easily be seen that SARG04 is a prepare-and-measure protocol as BB84 is.
Let us explain how SARG04 works. In SARG04 there are four quantum states, |ϕi〉 , i =
0, . . . , 3:
|ϕ0〉 = β |0x〉+ α |1x〉
|ϕm〉 = R−m |ϕ0〉 , m = 0, . . . , 3,
(8)
where α ≡ sin(pi/8), β ≡ cos(pi/8), and R ≡ cos(pi/4)I + sin(pi/4)(|1x〉 〈0x| − |0x〉 〈1x|) is
a pi/2 rotation around the Y basis. Note that |ϕ0〉 and |ϕ2〉 are orthonormal, and thus
form a basis. The same can be said for |ϕ1〉 and |ϕ3〉. The four states are divided into
four sets, {RK |ϕ0〉 , RK |ϕ1〉}, K ∈ [0, 3], in which one represents logic 0 and the other logic
1. The steps for the SARG04 protocol with a ν-photon source (ν = 1, 2) and one-way
communications are as follows:
1. Alice sends a sequence of N signals to Bob. For each signal, Alice randomly chooses
one of the four sets and sends one of the two states in the set to Bob.
10
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FIG. 2: An EDP version of the SARG04 protocol. Alice prepares an entangled states |Ψ〉AB =
(|0z〉A |ϕ⊗ν0 〉B+ |1z〉A |ϕ⊗ν1 〉B)/
√
2 where ν = 1, 2 corresponds to the number of photons emitted by
Alice. She applies a random rotation on system B before sending it to Bob through Eve. In the
case of ν = 2, Eve retains one qubit of system B and sends the other to Bob. Although, only one
entangled state is shown for simplicify, one should be reminded that Eve may perform the most
general attack on the N entangled states as in Fig .1.
2. For each signal, Bob performs the polarization measurement using one of the two bases
randomly. If his detector fails to click, then he broadcasts this fact, and Alice and
Bob discard all the corresponding data.
3. For each signal, Alice publicly announces the choice of the set from which the state
was selected.
4. For each signal, Bob compares his measurement outcome to the two states in the set.
If his measurement outcome is orthogonal to one of the states in the set, then he
concludes that the other state has been sent, which is a conclusive result. On the
other hand, if his measurement outcome is not orthogonal to either of the states in
the set, he concludes that it is an inconclusive result. He broadcasts if he got the
conclusive result or not for each signal.
5. Alice randomly chooses some bits as test bits and announces their locations. Bob
estimates the bit error rate eν from the test bits by taking the ratio of the number of
incorrect conclusive test bits to the total number of conclusive test bits. If eν is too
high, they abort the protocol.
6. Alice and Bob retain only the conclusive untested bits.
7. They perform bit error correction and privacy amplification on the remaining bit string.
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We construct an EDP version of the SARG04 protocol, which is shown in Fig. 2. The
EDP version lends itself to an easy extension with two-way classical communications and
also a simplified analysis on the bounds on the bit error rates, both of which will be studied
in detail later in this paper. We consider Alice having a ν-photon source, ν = 1, 2. For each
signal, she first prepares an entangled state (|0z〉A |ϕ⊗ν0 〉B + |1z〉A |ϕ⊗ν1 〉B)/
√
2 and randomly
applies a rotation (RK)⊗ν to system B which is then sent to Bob through Eve. Eve applies
the most general attack on all the N signals jointly. We assume that Eve always sends
a qubit state or a vacuum state to Bob, which is related to the assumption we describe
in Section III. Bob, upon receiving the qubit, performs the inverse rotation R−K
′
and a
filtering operation whose successful operation is described by the Kraus operator as F =
sin pi
8
|0x〉B 〈0x| + cos pi8 |1x〉B 〈1x|. Here, the successful filtering corresponds to a conclusive
result [25, 26] in the prepare-and-measure SARG04 protocol. Alice and Bob then publicly
exchangeK andK ′ and keep the pairs withK = K ′. They randomly choose some states (test
bits) and perform Z measurements on the states. Then, they compare their measurement
outcome publicly in order to estimate the bit error rate on the remaining pairs (code bits).
This gives us a good estimation of the bit error rate on code bits thanks to the random
sampling theorem. On the other hand, the phase error rate on the code bits is estimated
from the bit error rate on the code bits by the theorem below. After the estimation, they
choose a CSS code that is sufficient to correct all the bit and phase errors. After the error
correction, they share maximally entangled states from which they perform Z measurements
to obtain a secure key. It is important to note that the phase error rate of the code bits can
be estimated from the bit error rate. Thanks to this estimation, Alice and Bob do not need
to perform test bit in X measurement, thus we can equivalently convert our EDP protocol
to the prepare-and-measure protocol by the Shor-Preskill’s arguments.
Theorem 1 (Density matrix of one-photon SARG04). For the one-photon case, the
diagonal elements of the density matrix of the EPR pair shared between Alice and Bob in
the Bell basis is
pX = eb − a
pZ =
3
2
eb − a (9)
pY = a,
where eb is the bit error rate, and eb/2 ≤ a ≤ eb.
12
Proof. See Appendix A.
There are two differences between this density matrix and that for BB84: (i) there is a
factor of 3
2
in pZ (whereas the factor is one in BB84), and (ii) a is no smaller than eb/2
(whereas a can be as small as zero in BB84). Such a restriction in a gives rise to mutual
information between bit and phase errors (see also [19]). This is because for bit and phase
errors to be independent (i.e. no mutual information), pY = a has be to equal to
3
2
e2b .
But, this is outside the range eb/2 ≤ a ≤ eb for eb < 13 which is the case of interest.
The lower bound on the bit error rate for the one-photon case can be found by solving
0 = 1 − H2(eb) − H2(3eb/2) + I(X;Z), which gives eb = 9.68% [19, 22]. Note that [22]
provided a better bound of eb = 10.95% with data preprocessing.
Theorem 2 (Density matrix of two-photon SARG04). For the two-photon case, the
diagonal elements of the worst case density matrix is
pX = eb − a
pZ ≤ xeb + g(x)− a, ∀x (10)
pY = a,
where g(x) = 1
6
(3− 2x+
√
6− 6√2x+ 4x2) and 0 ≤ a ≤ eb.
Proof. See Appendix A.
In this case, a is allowed to be zero. Thus, the lower bound on the bit error rate for
the two-photon case can be found by minimizing Eq. (7) over a, which leads to having
no mutual information between bit and phase errors (i.e. I(X;Z) = 0). Solving 0 =
1−H2(eb)−H2(minx xeb + g(x)) gives eb = 2.71% [19].
C. Privacy amplification for multi-photon signals
In real-life implementation, a weak laser pulse is often used to simulate a single-photon
source. However, since it actually emits weak coherent states, the laser outputs contain
some multi-photon states in addition to the desired single-photon states. The phases of
the coherent pulses are assumed to be randomized in a traditional laser source. Because of
this, the coherent states of the laser output reduce to classical mixtures of photon-number
13
states with a Poisson distribution. One important idea from GLLP [7] is that the amount of
privacy amplification needed when multi-photon signals are present is the same as if only the
key-generating signals are present. To illustrate the idea, let us consider the key-generation
rate for BB84. For BB84, the final key can only be generated by using the single-photon
states. If Alice and Bob knew the locations of the single-photon states, they could discard
all other multi-photon states and apply error correction and privacy amplification only to
the single-photon states. In this case, they could achieve a rate of
RBB84 = −Q1f(e1)H2(e1) +Q1[1−H2(e1)], (11)
where en is the bit error rate of the n-photon signal states, Qn is the gain
1 of the n-photon
signal state, and f(x) is the error correction efficiency as a function of error rate. The first
term is concerned with number of rounds of random hashing for determining the bit error
patterns and the H2(e1) in the second term is concerned with the privacy amplification.
Note that the bit error rate e1 is used for the privacy amplification term because of Eq. (3).
For BB84, Bob’s result is conclusive when Bob obtains bit value by the same measurement
basis as the one that Alice has chosen.
Note that the above rate is achieved only when Alice and Bob know the locations of
the single-photon states, which is not the case that Bob uses a threshold detector. One
method to achieve unconditional security without Alice and Bob knowing the locations of
the single-photon states was proposed by [7]. The idea is that privacy amplification applied
to all bit string is equivalent to that applied only to the bit string stemmed from the single-
photon states as if the locations of them are known. To show this, we consider the bit
value produced by k1 · V1 ⊕ kM · VM , where k1 and kM are the bit string stemmed from the
single- and multi-photon states after bit error correction, and V1 and VM are random strings
in a hash function having the same lengths as k1 and kM respectively. The first term of
k1 · V1 ⊕ kM · VM corresponds to privacy amplification applied to single-photon states only,
while the second term is some bit (possibly known to Eve). Since the first term is private to
Alice and Bob, even if the second term is completely known to Eve, the sum is still private
to Alice and Bob. With this idea, the key generation rate can be improved by considering
1 The gain of a particular type is the probability that the transmitted signal of that type is sent by Alice
and Bob gets a conclusive result.
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privacy amplification applied only to single-photon states:
RBB84 = −Qµf(Eµ)H2(Eµ) +Q1[1−H2(e1)]. (12)
In this paper, we consider SARG04 which is secure with single-photon and two-photon states.
In this case, the key generation rate is [19]
RSARG04 = −Qµf(Eµ)H2(Eµ) +Q1[1−H(Z1|X1)] +Q2[1−H(Z2|X2)], (13)
where the Zn (Xn) is a random variable corresponding to the phase (bit) error for the n-
photon state. The first term is the fraction of EPR pairs spent for error correction, the second
term is the contribution to the key rate from the single-photon states, and the third term is
the contribution from the two-photon states. Note that the mutual information between the
bit and phase errors is included. According to Theorem 2, the mutual information between
X2 and Z2 can be zero, meaning H(Z2|X2) = H(Z2).
In Eq. (12) and Eq. (13), the overall gain Qµ and the overall bit error rate Eµ are
parameters that Alice and Bob can estimate through public communications. On the other
hand, the gain Q1 (and Q2 for SARG04), and the bit error rate for the single-photon states
e1 (and e2 for SARG04) cannot be directly estimated. One way to estimate e1 and Q1 (and
e2 and Q2) is to consider the worst situation for Alice and Bob. For instance, in BB84, we
can pessimistically assume that all the errors happen only in the single-photon detection
events, leading to e1 = EµQµ/Q1 and Q1 = Qµ − pmulti/2, where pmulti is the probability of
Alice emitting multiple-photon states (see [10]). However, this gives a low key generation
rate and a short secure distance. Another way to estimate en and Qn is to use the decoy-
state method in [10], which we explain next. Using this method, the key generation rate
and the secure distance can be greatly increased.
D. Decoy-state method
In the security analysis with decoy states, we assume using the infinite-decoy-state method
of [10] for the simplicity of analyses. Let us first define the yield Yn, the bit error rate en,
the gain Qn. The yield, Yn, is defined as the probability that Bob’s measurement outcome
is conclusive conditional on Alice’s n-photon emission:
Yn , Pr{Bob’s result is conclusive|Alice sent n-photon state}. (14)
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The yield is basically a sum of the probabilities of the error events and the error-free events.
The fraction of the error-event probability is the bit error rate en:
en , Pr{Bob’s result is incorrect|
Bob’s result is conclusive ∧ Alice sent n-photon state}. (15)
The gain of the n-photon state is
Qn , Pr{Bob’s result is conclusive ∧Alice sent n-photon state} (16)
= Yne
−µµn/n!. (17)
The key of the decoy method is to consider the two equations for the overall gain Qµ and
the overall bit error rate Eµ. The overall gain is the weighted average of the yields of all
n-photon states:
Qµ = Y0e
−µ + Y1e−µµ+ · · ·+ Yne−µ(µn/n!) + · · · . (18)
The overall QBER is the weight average of the errors of all n-photon states:
Eµ =
1
Qµ
∞∑
n=0
Yne
−µ(µn/n!)en (19)
The main point of the method is to vary the laser intensity µ over all non-negative values
randomly. Each value of µ is associated with one equation for Qµ and one for Eµ. Thus, by
varying µ, we have a set of linear equations of Yn and en, which can then be solved. The
states that are used for the determination of Yn and en with the different µ’s are the decoy
states, which will not be used to generate the final key. Another set of states, the signal
states, will be used for key generation and are outputs from one laser intensity only. To
make sure that Yn and en estimated from the decoy states are good estimates of Yn and en
for the signal states, we randomize the locations of both states so that Eve can only act
equally on them. Once we have good estimates of Yn (thus, Qn) and en, we can determine
the achievable key-generation rate by using Eq. (12) for BB84 and Eq. (13) for SARG04.
For SARG04, we use the relations between the phase and bit error rates in Eq. (9) and
Eq. (10) to determine the phase error rates from the bit error rates.
For BB84, the expected values for the yields and the bit error rates without any eaves-
dropping are [10]
Yn,BB84 = [ηn + (1− ηn)pdark]/2 (20)
en,BB84 = (ηn
edetector
2
+ (1− ηn)pdark 1
4
)/Yn,BB84, (21)
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where ηn, pdark, and edetector are transmission efficiency for an n-photon signal, the probability
that the detector clicks when the input is a vacuum state, and a parameter representing the
misalignment in the detector, respectively. The presence of any eavesdropping would deviate
the actual values of them and thus would be caught by Alice and Bob. For SARG04, we
will derive similar formulas for Yn and en later in this paper, and also we will describe the
SARG04 protocol with decoy states.
E. QKD with two-way classical communications
In Shor-Preskill’s proof, they showed that applying the bit and phase error corrections
with CSS code followed by Z measurements to a pool of noisy EPR pairs is equivalent
to applying the Z measurement followed by bit error correction and privacy amplification.
This order swapping is applicable to any pool of noisy EPR pairs characterized by some
(pX , pY , pZ). Imagine that, before the bit and phase error corrections and the final Z mea-
surements , we insert an extra operation on the EPR pairs that changes the pairs to have
some other characteristics (p′X , p
′
Y , p
′
Z). One reason that we want to insert such an extra
operation is to increase the highest tolerable bit error rate of a QKD protocol. Since, af-
ter this extra operation, we are also left with a pool of noisy EPR pairs, we can invoke
the Shor-Preskill’s argument to move the final Z measurements to before the bit and phase
error correction steps. However, this is not (yet) a prepare-and-measure protocol since Shor-
Preskill’s proof only brings the Z measurements to after the extra operation. If this extra
operation commutes with the Z measurements, then we can swap their order and turn it
into a prepare-and-measure protocol.
A specific operation for this extra operation was considered by Gottesman and Lo [28].
Their operation commutes with the Z measurements (so is compatible with prepare-and-
measure protocols) and is composed of a sequence of steps applied to the EPR pairs. There
are two types of steps, a B step and a P step. As the names imply, a B step (P step)
is meant to improve the bit (phase) error rate of the EPR pairs. A B step requires two-
way classical communications for exchanging information between Alice and Bob. Hence,
prepare-and-measure protocols derived from using this technique requires two-way classical
communications.
Definition 1 (B step [28]). A B step, shown in Fig. 3, consists of Alice and Bob together
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FIG. 3: B step: Alice performs a bilateral XOR on her halves of two EPR pairs (the circuit of
which is depicted) and Bob performs the same on his halves of the EPR pairs. They measure the
target qubits in the Z basis. If their measurement results are same, they keep the source EPR pair
and discard the target; otherwise, they discard both EPR pairs.
performing a bilateral XOR on two EPR pairs randomly chosen and comparing their Z
measurement results of the target pair. If their results are the same, they keep the source
EPR pair and discard the target EPR pair. If they are different, they discard both pairs.
When the two EPR pairs initially have no bit error or both have a bit error, the measurement
results will be the same. When only one of the two pairs has a bit error, the measurement
results will be different. The bilateral XOR is equivalent to two measurements of Z ⊗ Z,
one by Alice and one by Bob. Thus, a B step commutes with the final Z measurements
in a prepare-and-measure protocol. Suppose that initially the EPR pairs are in the state
(pX , pY , pZ), applying a B step to every pair of EPR pairs leads to a smaller set of surviving
pairs with a new state (p′X , p
′
Y , p
′
Z)
p′X = (p
2
X + p
2
Y )/pS (22)
p′Y = 2pXpY /pS (23)
p′Z = 2(1− pX − pY − pZ)pZ/pS (24)
pS = 1− 2(pX + pY )(1− pX − pY ), (25)
where pS is the probability that a source EPR pair survives the step. Note that half of the
EPR pairs are target pairs and are always discarded after a B step.
Definition 2 (P step [28]). A P step, shown in Fig. 4, operates on three EPR pairs
randomly chosen, one target and two source pairs. Alice and Bob perform a bilateral XOR
on the target and a source pairs and then perform a second bilateral XOR on the target and
the second source pairs. The phase error syndrome is the X measurements of the two source
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FIG. 4: P step: Alice adds (module 2) her halves of three EPR pairs (the circuit of which is
depicted) and Bob performs the same on his halves of the EPR pairs. They keep the target EPR
pair and discard the other two. The X measurements of the two source pairs do not need to be
performed in a prepare-and-measure QKD.
pairs, which is not needed in a prepare-and-measure QKD. The target pair is kept for the
next step. The P step requires no communications between Alice and Bob and is really a
classical circuit. So, the P step commutes with the final Z measurements of a QKD. If the
Z measurements is performed before the P step, the P step is equivalent to XOR’ing three
bits to generate one bit. Suppose that initially the EPR pairs are in the state (pX , pY , pZ),
a P step leads to a new state
p′X = 3p
2
I(pX + pY ) + 6pIpXpZ + 3p
2
XpY + p
3
X (26)
p′Y = 6pIpY pZ + 3pX(p
2
Y + p
2
Z) + 3pY p
2
Z + p
3
Y (27)
p′Z = 3pI(p
2
Y + p
2
Z) + 6pXpY pZ + 3p
2
Y pZ + p
3
Z (28)
pI = 1− pX − pY − pZ , (29)
where pI is the initial probability of no error. Note that only one-third of the EPR pairs
remain after a P step.
The reduction from a EDP with B and P steps to BB84 is possible because these steps sat-
isfy the “no-branching (in X operators) requirement” in Gottesman-Lo’s paper [28]. Specif-
ically, the decision of which EPR pairs to discard and which to retain only depends on the
outcomes of Z measurements, but not on the outcomes of X measurements. For BB84,
Gottesman and Lo [28] showed that a sequence of five B steps, followed by six P steps, can
give rise to a tolerable bit error rate of 18.9%. Since pY cannot be estimated in BB84, it
is necessary to consider the worst-case value of pY when determining the tolerable bit error
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rate. They showed that pY = 0 is the worst case for any sequence starting with a B step.
In this paper, we consider finding the highest tolerable bit error rate for SARG04 using
Gottesman and Lo’s technique. We also prove the worst-case value of pY for SARG04.
III. ASSUMPTIONS ON THE DEVICES
In this section, we describe some assumptions we make in this paper.
First, note that Bob sometimes has a double click where he cannot determine the mea-
surement outcome. This happens because of the dark counts or detecting multi-photon. In
this case, we impose Bob to take one of the bit values randomly [7, 8]. Thus, we can re-
gard his measurement outcome as always stemming from the measurement on a qubit state.
This operation is so-called “squash operation” in [7], which is a operation mapping from a
multi-photon state to a qubit state. Furthermore, we assume the measurement such that it
can be represented by the squash operation followed by a proper operations in a protocol.
For instance, Bob’s measurement can be described by the squash operation followed by the
rotations, the filtering operation and Z basis measurement in SARG04 protocol. We assume
this model based on the squash operation in the whole paper.
In Section V, we will consider five types of imperfections in realistic QKD set-ups: (i) the
source is a laser source that generates a Poisson distribution of photon number state, (ii)
there is loss in the optical fiber, (iii) Bob’s detector is not completely efficient in declaring a
detection event, (iv) Bob’s detector may generate a false detection when there is no input,
and (v) there is misalignment in Bob’s detector.
Assuming the phase randomization, the single-mode laser source emits a pulse that is a
classical mixtures of the photon number states with a Poisson distribution:
∞∑
i=0
µ
i!
e−µ |i〉 〈i| , (30)
where µ is the mean photon number.
We quantify the loss in the optical fiber by the probability that an input photon is lost
at the end of the transmission. Let α in dB/km be the loss coefficient of the optical fiber
and l be the fiber length in km. The probability that the input photon is not lost is equal
to 10−
αl
10 .
It is the case that Bob’s detector fails to indicate the presence of an input photon. The
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effect is similar to the transmission loss. The probability that Bob’s detector detects the
presence of an input photon is defined as Bob’s detection efficiency ηBob.
Combining the loss in the quantum channel and the inefficiency of Bob’s detector, we
have the overall transmission efficiency, η. It is the probability that a photon is detected
given that one has been sent, which is given by
η = 10−
αl
10 · ηBob (31)
When the input signal contains more than one photons, the signal is detected if at least one
photon is detected. Thus, the transmission efficiency for an n-photon signal is
ηn = 1− (1− η)n. (32)
When there is no input to Bob’s detector, there is a possibility that it generates a detection
event. This is due to the intrinsic detector’s dark counts, the background spray, and the
leakage from timing signals. We denote the probability of this false detection event as pdark.
We model the misalignment of the detectors by a rotation in the bases of Bob’s projection
measurements. We will calculate the probabilities of inconclusive, correct, and incorrect
results specifically for SARG04 using this model in Section V.
IV. SARG04 WITH ONE- AND TWO-PHOTON SOURCES
In this section, we derive the lower and upper bounds of the tolerable bit error rates for
SARG04 with two-way classical communications, where we consider using perfect one- and
two-photon sources.
A. Lower bounds with two-way communications
To determine the highest tolerable bit error rate, we would like to search for the sequence
of B steps and P steps (introduced in Section II E) that, when followed by the one-way EDP
with random CSS to correct bit and phase errors, gives a positive key generate rate for the bit
error rate in question. The sequence of B and P steps renders the initial state (pI , pX , pY , pZ)
to another state (p′I , p
′
X , p
′
Y , p
′
Z), which is then passed to the one-way protocol for producing
almost perfect EPR pairs. The key generation rate, based on the CSS protocol, is
R = 1−H(p′X + p′Y )−H(p′Z + p′Y ). (33)
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Note that we have ignored the mutual information between the bit and phase errors for
simplicity of analyses. For the single-photon case of SARG04, the initial state is pX = eb−a,
pZ =
3
2
eb−a, pY = a, where Alice and Bob can estimate eb but not a. Thus, for the purpose
of determining the highest tolerable bit error rate, we consider the worst-case value of a for
a given eb and a given sequence such that the initial state with this value will lead to the
smallest key generation rate. A proof of this for BB84 was given in [28]. Here we adapt
their proof to SARG04 and have the following theorem:
Theorem 3. For an initial state of pX = eb − a, pZ = ξeb − a, pY = a, where ξ ∈ R ≥ 1
is some constant, the key generation rate as given in Eq. (33) is an increasing function of a
for a fixed eb and a fixed sequence of B steps and P steps starting with a B step, under the
following conditions:
(i) eb <
1+4a
2(1+ξ)
∀a in the valid range, and
(ii) eb <
1
2ξ
.
Proof. See Appendix B.
Note that Theorem 3 is a simple generalization of the result in Appendix III of [28]. For
the single-photon case, we apply Theorem 3 with ξ = 3
2
. Given the valid range of a being
[eb/2, eb], we have the following:
Corollary 1. The worst-case for single-photon SARG04 is a = eb
2
.
We have written a simple computer program in Mathematica to calculate the evolution of
the diagonal elements of the marginal density matrix of the EPR pairs shared by Alice and
Bob under sequences of B and P steps using Eqs. (22)-(29). With a = eb
2
, we exhaustively
searched for the step sequence with 15 B/P steps or less that can tolerate the highest bit
error rate. For each sequence, we searched for the highest initial value of eb that gives rise to
a positive key generation rate given by Eq. (33). We conclude that eb = 19.9% is tolerable
with nine B steps. We can easily check that this value of eb satisfies the two conditions
of Theorem 3. Since in each B step, Alice and Bob discard at least half of the EPR pairs
that have survived so far, a protocol with nine B steps leaves only a small number of EPR
pairs at the end of the protocol. Thus, a sequence with nine B steps may not be efficient in
practice. Therefore, we consider the highest tolerable bit error rates with various maximum
numbers of steps allowed, as shown in Fig. 5. As can be seen, even a protocol with two B
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FIG. 5: The highest tolerable bit error rates with various maximum number of B or P steps
allowed. It turns out only B steps are used in all cases to achieve the highest bit error rates. Even
when a small number of B steps is used, the tolerable bit error rate increase quite substantially
compared to the case where no B step is used. Note that only up to 9 (6) steps are plotted for the
single-photon (two-photon) case since sequences with more steps are less optimal.
steps is able to tolerate a bit error rate of 16.1%, which is a great improvement from that
of one-way protocols (10.95% from [19, 22]).
We now consider two-photon SARG04, whose density matrix satisfies Eq. (10). Since
pZ ≤ xeb + g(x)− a, ∀x, we can minimize the right-hand side over x to find the worst-case
pZ . Substituting in the minimizing x gives us the initial state
pX = eb − a
pZ =
1
2
− 1
2
√
2
(1− 3eb) +
√
1− (1− 3eb)2
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− a (34)
pY = a,
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where 0 ≤ a ≤ eb. Since pZ can be written as pZ = ξeb − a for some ξ ≥ 1 and for a fixed
eb, we can invoke Theorem 3 to arrive at the following:
Corollary 2. The worst-case for two-photon SARG04 is a = 0.
In the worst case, we found that eb = 6.56% is tolerable with six B steps for two-
photon SARG04. This is greater than the tolerable bit error rate of 2.71% using one-way
communications [19]. The highest tolerable bit error rates with various maximum numbers
of steps allowed for the two-photon is also shown in Fig. 5. As can be seen, even when a
smaller number of B steps is used, the tolerable bit error rate increase quite substantially
compared to the case where no B step is used.
The steps for the SARG04 protocol with a ν-photon source (ν = 1, 2) involving B steps
are similar to the one-way SARG04 protocol in Section IIB and are as follows:
1-6. Same as that in one-way SARG04.
7. B step: Alice randomly divides the bits into pairs and informs this to Bob. They
separately compute the parity for each pair and compare their results with each other.
If they have the same parity for a pair, they keep one bit and discard the other bit of
the pair; otherwise, both bits are discarded. This step is repeated as many times as
needed.
8. They perform bit error correction and privacy amplification on the remaining bit string
using the revised bit error rate.
B. Upper bounds with two-way communications
An upper bound for single-photon SARG04 with one-way communications was provided
in [22]. This upper bound of 14.9% is lower than our lower bound of 19.9% with two-
way communications. In other words, as far as the single-photon component is concerned,
SARG04 with two-way classical communications can tolerate a higher bit error rate than
SARG04 with only one-way classical communications. A similar behaviour was previously
found in BB84 [28]. Here, we will investigate the upper bound with two-way communications
for both single-photon and two-photon in SARG04.
24
To arrive at an upper bound, we note that security cannot be established between Alice
and Bob if there is no entanglement shared between them [33]. Specifically, when the density
matrix of Alice and Bob is separable, i.e. ρAB =
∑
i ρA,i⊗ρB,i, then there is no entanglement.
One result from BDSW [32] is that, for a bipartite state with a density matrix of the form
ρ = p1 |Φ+〉 〈Φ+|+ p2 |Φ−〉 〈Φ−|+ p3 |Ψ+〉 〈Ψ+|+ p4 |Ψ−〉 〈Ψ−| , (35)
if none of the probabilities p1, . . . , p4 is greater than
1
2
, then ρ can be written as a mixture of
separable states and thus no entanglement exists. Using this idea, we may find the bit error
rate with which the Bell diagonal elements of our density matrices of SARG04 in Eq. (9) and
Eq. (10) are all no greater than 1
2
. We may imagine eb to be small initially, in which case pI
is close to unity and pX , pY , and, pZ are close to zero. Then, we gradually increase eb until
pI goes down to
1
2
. Although the BDSW idea applies only to Bell-diagonal density matrix
and our density matrices may not be Bell diagonal, we can still apply the BDSW idea to
our case since whether the off-diagonal terms are zero or not has no bearing on the B steps,
the P steps, the CSS error correction, and the CSS privacy amplification in our protocol. In
other words, our entanglement distillation method does not extract entanglement from the
off-diagonal terms. Thus, we may safely regard our density matrices as Bell-diagonal.
For single-photon SARG04, setting pI =
1
2
gives eb =
1
5
+ 2a
5
. Given the valid range of a,
this suggests that eb is between
1
4
and 1
3
. Eve would like to cause the error rate as low as
possible. But she may not be able to choose a freely to induce an error rate of 1/4, since a
is an parameter influenced by her and is not in her complete control in any attack strategy
by her. Thus, without any reference to a specific attack strategy, the value of a (and the
upper bound on eb) cannot be specified. Therefore, we focus on specific intercept-and-resend
strategies to determine specific values of a and an upper bound on eb.
In an intercept-and-resend attack, Eve captures and measures the photon sent by Alice to
Bob. She then sends another photon with the polarization depending on the measurement
result to Bob. Certainly, no entanglement exists between Alice and Bob, since Bob’s photon
was created by Eve. In a simple intercept-and-resend attack, Eve performs a photon polar-
ization measurement with a basis randomly chosen from two bases. The first basis consists
of |ϕ0〉 and |ϕ2〉, while the second consists of |ϕ1〉 and |ϕ3〉. After the measurement, Eve
sends the resultant state to Bob. This particular attack causes an error rate of 1
3
. The fact
that this is at the high end of the range [1
4
, 1
3
] prompts us to search for a more sophisticated
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intercept-and-resend attack.
Definition 3 (General POVM attack). A general POVM attack is an individual
intercept-and-resend attack by Eve who captures every transmission from Alice (each which
may consist of one or more photons), performs an arbitrary POVM measurement on each
transmission independently, and sends an arbitrary state to Bob depending on the mea-
surement outcome. The POVM is arbitrary and can be represented by J + 1 elements,
{Mvac,Mi, i = [0, . . . , J − 1]}, with Mvac +
∑
iMi = I. For the outcome corresponding to
Mvac, Eve sends vacuum to Bob, whereas, for outcome i, she sends an arbitrary state |σi〉
to Bob.
We consider Eve launching such a general POVM attack for the SARG04 one-photon
case and two-photon case. We want to optimize over Mvac, Mi, and |σi〉 so that Eve induces
the lowest possible bit error rate, hoping to achieve a rate smaller than 1/3 caused by the
simple attack described above for the one-photon case. Unfortunately, for the one-photon
case, even with such a great freedom to choose the POVM and the states sent, this attack
cannot do better than the simple attack.
Theorem 4. For single-photon SARG04, the smallest bit error rate eb caused by Eve using
a general POVM attack is 1
3
.
Proof. See Appendix C.
On the other hand, for two-photon SARG04, it is not trivial to consider intercept-and-
resend attack and thus we only consider a general POVM attack.
Theorem 5. For two-photon SARG04, the smallest bit error rate eb caused by Eve using a
general POVM attack is 3−
√
2
7
≈ 22.65%. Moreover, a POVM that gives rise to this minimum
bit error rate is
Mm = P (λ+ |ϕm〉 |ϕm〉+ λ− |ϕm+2〉 |ϕm+2〉) , m = 0, . . . , 3 (36)
M
vac
= P (|ϕ0〉 |ϕ2〉 − |ϕ2〉 |ϕ0〉)/2 (37)
= P (|ϕ3〉 |ϕ1〉 − |ϕ1〉 |ϕ3〉)/2 (38)
where λ± = (±2 +
√
2)/4, P (|Φ〉) = |Φ〉 〈Φ| is a projection operator associated with a pure
state |Φ〉, and the subscript in ϕm+2 is taken in modulo 4. Eve sends |ϕm〉 to Bob when the
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measurement outcome is m ∈ [0, 3]. Note that M
vac
never occurs, since the four states sent
by Alice, |ϕm〉 |ϕm〉 , m ∈ [0, 3], are orthogonal to the state Mvac projects onto.
Proof. See Appendix C.
C. Comparison with BB84 in depolarizing channels
We compare the lower and upper bounds with two-way communications of SARG04
and of BB84 by assuming that the eavesdropping is realized by a depolarizing channel.
A depolarizing channel evolves an ν-photon input ρ⊗ν to (1 − 4p
3
)ρ⊗ν + 4p
3
(I/2)⊗ν with a
depolarizing rate p. For SARG04, the depolarizing rate p is related to the bit error rate eb by
eb = 4p/(3 + 4p), whereas, for BB84, eb = 2p/3. Using these formulas, we see that SARG04
is secure up to p ≈ 18.6% for one-photon and p ≈ 5.27% for two-photon, and BB84 is secure
up to p ≈ 28.35% [28] with two-way communications. For the upper bounds, SARG04 is
insecure beyond p = 3/8 for one-photon and p = 3(2−√2)/8 ≈ 22.0% for two-photon, and
BB84 is insecure beyond p = 3/8 [28].
V. SARG04 WITH REALISTIC SOURCES USING DECOY
With a realistic phase-randomized laser source, the output pulses are classical mixtures
of the photon number states with a Poisson distribution. In this section, we consider using
the decoy method of [10] to operate SARG04 securely with a realistic source. With this
particular decoy method, the mean photon number of the laser source when emitting the
decoy states varies over infinitely many values, in order to estimate the statistics for the
decoy states. Works in [11, 12, 13, 14, 15] analyzed practical decoy schemes with only a
few decoy states. Here, we consider applying the infinite-decoy idea to SARG04 for the
simplicity of analyses.
The steps for the SARG04 protocol with decoy states are as follows:
1. Alice randomly chooses the locations of the decoy states and the signal states.
2. For the decoy states, Alice adjusts the power of the laser to have a random mean-
photon number µ and she records this value of µ. For signal states, Alice operates the
laser at a fixed mean-photon number.
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3. Alice randomly chooses one of the four sets and sends one of the two states in the set
to Bob.
4. Bob performs the polarization measurement using one of the two bases randomly. If
his detector fails to click, then he broadcasts this fact, and Alice and Bob discard all
the corresponding data.
5. Alice announces the sets of states for both decoy and signal states to Bob. She also
announces the locations of the decoy states, their values of µ, and their states.
6. Bob, based on the information on the sets of states, broadcasts which bits are conclu-
sive or not.
7. For all the decoy states having the same µ, Bob estimates Qµ by taking the ratio of
the number of conclusive events to the total number of conclusive, inconclusive, and
no-detection events. He estimates Eµ by taking the ratio of the number of incorrect
conclusive events to the total number of conclusive events.
8. Bob then estimates e1 and e2 based on Qµ’s and Eµ’s over all values of µ’s.
9. If both of e1 and e2 are too high, they abort the protocol.
10. Alice and Bob discard all events concerned with inconclusive and all decoy states.
11. They perform bit error correction on the remaining bit string and apply privacy am-
plification.
In this section, we analyze the key generation rate of this protocol under the same sit-
uation as was considered in [10], in which (i) the source is a phase randomized coherent
source, (ii) there is loss in the optical fiber, (iii) Bob’s detection is not completely efficient
in declaring a detection event, (iv) there are dark counts, and (v) there is misalignment in
Bob’s detector. We first develop a specific detector error model for SARG04, which is then
be used to formulate the yield and the error rate equations for SARG04. With the yields
and the error rates, we can compute the achievable key-generation rates.
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A. Model for detector errors in SARG04
We consider a specific error model for detections in SARG04. We have chosen this model
because it is also a simple model for explaining errors in BB84 and thus would provide a
reasonable performance comparison with BB84. In the decoy paper for BB84 [10], they used
the Gobby-Yuan-Shields (GYS) [30] experimental results to characterize the probability of
detector error in BB84, denoted by edetector. The value of this probability is specific to
the setup in the GYS experiment which is for BB84. Although an experimental setup for
SARG04 might be the same as that for BB84 (since their quantum phases are the same),
their interpretations of errors are different and thus there is no reason to believe that the
error probabilities describing both setups are exactly the same. Nevertheless, in order to
facilitate a reasonable comparison between SARG04 and BB84, we attribute the probability
of detector error to a rotation of the detector by a small angle. Specifically, we model the
misalignment of the detectors by a rotation of angle θ in the two projection measurements
at Bob’s side. Using the same model for both SARG04 and BB84, we can compare their
results on a common ground. For SARG04, we can calculate the probabilities of getting the
inconclusive, incorrect, and correct outcomes for each of the four bases. For example, Fig. 6
shows the calculation for the basis {↔,ր}. In the end, we conclude that given a successful
detection event at Bob’s detector, Pr{conclusive} = sin2(θ)
2
+ 1
4
, Pr{incorrect} = sin2(θ)
2
,
and Pr{correct} = 1
4
. For BB84, the probability of detection error can easily be seen to
be sin2(θ). Similarly, we perform the same calculations when Bob detects a vacuum state
and a dark count occurs. We arrive at Pr{inconclusive} = 1/2, Pr{correct} = 1/4, and
Pr{incorrect} = 1/4. These probabilities are used later in the calculations of the yields and
the bit error rates for SARG04.
B. Key generation rate using decoy
Recall that the key generation rate for SARG04 with decoy is
RSARG04 ≥ −Qµf(Eµ)H2(Eµ) +Q1[1−H2(Z1|X1)] +Q2[1−H2(ep,2)], (39)
where the subscript µ denotes the mean photon number for the signal states, Qµ is the gain
of the signal states, Eµ is the QBER of the signal states, Qj and ep,j, (j = 1, 2) are the gains
and the phase error rates of the single-photon states (j = 1) and the two-photon states
29
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FIG. 6: Calculation of measurement probabilities with misalignment of the detectors for the basis
{↔,ր}. The misalignment is modeled by a rotation of the two measurement bases, θ. For this
basis, the conclusive results are l and տ.
(j = 2), Z1 and X1 are random variables characterizing the phase and bit errors for the
single-photon states (see Section II for definition), f(x) is the error correction efficiency as
a function of error rate, and H2(x) is the binary entropy function.
We note that both single-photon states and two-photon states have positive contributions
to the key generation rate, in contrast to BB84, the key generation rate of which has only
the single-photon-state contribution. Also, since there is mutual information between the
bit and phase errors for the single-photon case, we have included this contribution to the
key generation in Eq. (39). The parameters Qµ and Eµ in Eq. (39) can be estimated through
public communications. The phase error rates ep,1 and ep,2 can be estimated respectively
from the bit error rates e1 and e2 (using the relations in Eq. (9) and Eq. (10) with the
worst-case values of a = e1/2 and a = 0 respectively). The bit error rates e1 and e2, along
with Q1 and Q2, can in turn be estimated using the decoy state idea. In what follows, we
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derive the formulas for these parameters for SARG04, and thus, using these parameters, we
can determine the key generation rate using Eq. (39).
C. Yields and bit error rates
We now determine the yields and the bit error rates of the transmitted qubits for SARG04.
Using the definition of the yield in Eq. (14), the yield for SARG04 is
Yn,SARG04 = ηn
(
edetector
2
+
1
4
)
+ (1− ηn)pdark 1
2
, (40)
where edetector = sin
2(θ). The fraction of 1
4
corresponds to the probability of getting a
conclusive result. Compared to the yield for BB84 in Eq. (20), we see that the yield stemmed
from the signal for SARG04 is approximately half of that for BB84. On the other hand, the
yields stemmed from the dark count are the same for SARG04 and BB84. Similarly, for the
bit error rate,
en,SARG04 =
[
ηn
edetector
2
+ (1− ηn)pdark 1
4
]
/Yn,SARG04. (41)
Thus, the overall gain and the overall QBER for the coherent state |√µ〉 are, respectively,
Qµ,SARG04 =
1
2
pdarke
−ηµ +
(
edetector
2
+
1
4
)
(1− e−ηµ), and (42)
Eµ,SARG04 =
[
1
4
pdarke
−ηµ +
edetector
2
(1− e−ηµ)
]
/Qµ,SARG04. (43)
Using these formulas for the error rates and the gains, we can compute the key generation
rate for SARG04 with one-way decoy using Eq. (39).
D. Simulations
Fig. 7 compares the key generation rates of SARG04 and BB84, both using the one-way
infinite-decoy method. For this simulation, we take f(Eµ) = 1.22 for simplicity and use the
parameters from the experiments by Gobby et al. [30] as shown in Table II. We assumed
that the detectors in both cases are rotated by the same angle in our model. The optimal
mean photon numbers, µ, for SARG04 and BB84 are used at all distances. Two curves of
SARG04 using decoy are plotted, one with both single- and two-photon contributions and
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FIG. 7: Simulation using the GYS parameters listed in Table II and f(Eµ) = 1.22, for both
SARG04 and BB84. We compare the key generation rates of SARG04 and BB84 using decoy
states (solid curves) and without using decoy states (dashed curves). The optimal mean photon
numbers, µ, for all curves are used at all distances. Two curves of SARG04 using decoy are
plotted, one with both single- and two-photon contributions and the other with only single-photon
contributions. Also, curves of single-photon SARG04 and of BB84 using GLLP without decoy are
plotted. The maximal secure distance is 97.2km for SARG04 and 141.8km for BB84. However, the
upper bounds for SARG04 and for BB84 are exactly the same, namely, 207.68 km.
the other with only single-photon contributions. Comparing these two curves, it can be
seen that the two-photon part has a small contribution to the key generation rates at all
distances. Also, curves of single-photon SARG04 and of BB84 using GLLP without decoy
are plotted. We see that, by using decoy, higher key generation rates and longer secure
distance can be achieved. A similar behaviour for BB84 was shown in [10]. We note that
the key generation rate for BB84 with GLLP in Fig. 1 of [10] is smaller than ours. This
is because we used the optimal µ for all distances in Fig. 7 while µ proportional to η was
used in [10]. The maximal secure distance for SARG04 using decoy is 97.2km, compared
to 141.8km for BB84. The upper bound of the distance in SARG04 can be determined by
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Wavelength [nm] α [dB/km] ηBob edetector pdark
1550 0.21 4.5% 3.3% 1.7× 10−6
TABLE II: Simulation parameters from Gobby-Yuan-Shields (GYS) experiments [30].
finding the distances corresponding to e1 =
1
3
and to e2 = 0.2265; they are, respectively,
207.68 km and 201.43 km. Thus, the upper bound of the distance is 207.68 km, at which
the two-photon part is not secure but the single-photon part is. Interestingly, this bound of
207.68 km is exactly the same as the upper bound for BB84 [10]. It can be shown analytically
that setting e1 =
1
3
for the SARG04 case and setting e1 =
1
4
for the BB84 case both give the
same formula for η1, specifically, η1 =
pdark
1−4edetector+pdark . (The formulas for en and Yn of BB84
are of course different from that of SARG04.) The optimal µ’s for achieving the highest key
generation rate at each distance for SARG04 and BB84 using decoy are plotted in Fig. 8.
We can see that, when the misalignment of the detector is large (i.e. large edetector), the
optimal mean photon number for BB84 is higher than that of SARG04. On the other hand,
when the misalignment is small, the optimal µ of SARG04 is higher at short and medium
distances. In addition, the optimal µ of SARG04 can be higher than one in this case. This
is reasonable since at short or medium distances, the bit error rate is not high and thus
the key contribution from the two-photon part in SARG04 is relatively high; on the other
hand, at long distances, the two-photon contribution is relatively small. Since the optimal
µ for SARG04 and BB84 is approximately constant for a large range of distances, the key
generation rates for both of SARG04 and BB84 are in the order of O(η).
Fig. 9 shows the simulation using the parameters from Fig. 4 of [22]. Our result shows
that, under our assumption that Eve may perform the most general attack, BB84 is able to
achieve both a higher secret key rate and a greater secure distance than SARG04, whereas,
under the assumption considered by [22] that Eve may only perform incoherent attacks,
they observed the reverse phenomenon in Fig. 4 of their paper (i.e. SARG04 has a higher
key rate and greater distance than BB84). Another difference between our result and that
of [22] is that we also consider contributions from the two-photon part.
In both Figs. 7 and 9, there are gaps between the one-photon SARG04 curves and the
BB84 curves whether or not decoy is used. These gaps are mainly due to the decrease in
the gain Qn and the increase in the bit error rate en in SARG04 relative to BB84. We
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FIG. 8: The optimal µ’s for achieving the highest key generation rate at each distance for SARG04
using Eq. (13) and for BB84 using Eq. (12). Three sets of parameters are plotted. The bottom
two, middle two, and top two curves for BB84 and SARG04 used the same parameters except
for edetector (which are 0.033, 0.01, and 0.0001, respectively). The other common parameters are
listed in Table II and f(Eµ) = 1.22. When the misalignment of the detector is large (i.e. large
edetector) as in the bottom two curves, BB84 uses a laser with a higher optimal mean photon number
than SARG04. When the misalignment becomes smaller as in the top two curves, the situation is
reversed; SARG04 operates optimally with a higher µ than BB84 does. Also, note that the optimal
µ for SARG04 can be higher than one.
can see this as follows. By comparing the yields of SARG04 in Eq. (40) and of BB84 in
Eq. (20), in both the case of a large edetector (i.e. ηnedetector ≫ (1 − ηn)pdark, corresponding
to Figs. 7) and the case of edetector = 0 (corresponding to Figs. 9), we can see that the yields
in SARG04 is about half of that in BB84; this means that Qn in SARG04 is also about half
of that in BB84. Similarly, by comparing the bit error rates of SARG04 in Eq. (41) and of
BB84 in Eq. (21), we can see that en in SARG04 is about twice of that in BB84 for both
figures; this means that the amount of privacy amplification needed for the one-photon part
of SARG04 is higher than that for BB84 (even when the mutual information between the bit
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FIG. 9: Simulation using α = 0.25, ηBob = 0.1, edetector = 0, pdark = 10
−5 (from [22]), and
f(Eµ) = 1, for both SARG04 and BB84. We compare the key generation rates of SARG04 and
BB84 using decoy states (solid curves) and without using decoy states (dashed curves). The optimal
mean photon numbers, µ, all curves are used at all distance. Two curves of SARG04 using decoy
are plotted, one with both single- and two-photon contributions and the other with only single-
photon contributions. Also, curves of single-photon SARG04 and of BB84 using GLLP without
decoy are plotted.
and phase errors in one-photon SARG04 is taken into account). From the key generation
rate equations in Eq. (12) and Eq. (13), the decrease in Qn and the increase in en both
reduce the key generation rate of one-photon SARG04 relative to BB84, whether or not
decoy is used. Furthermore, based on our simulations, we observe that the gap between
SARG04 and BB84 decreases as edetector decreases.
VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
We have provided lower and upper bounds on the bit error rates for SARG04 with two-
way classical communications. Both the single-photon part and the two-photon part were
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considered. For the single-photon part, we have shown that SARG04 with two-way commu-
nications can tolerate a higher bit error rate than SARG04 with one-way communications.
However, it does not mean that for some smaller bit error rate, two-way SARG04 protocol
has higher key generation rate than the one-way version.
The upper bounds were found by considering a general intercept-and-resend attack by
Eve. In this attack, she performs an arbitrary POVM and sends arbitrary states to Bob
according to the measurement outcome. For the one-photon case, we have shown that such
generality in her attack does not offer any advantage over a simple intercept-and-resend
attack where she only performs measurement and sends the measurement results to Bob.
We have also studied SARG04 with a coherent source using the decoy-state method
to achieve unconditional security. The key generation rate is significantly improved by
combining the GLLP and the decoy-state ideas compared to the non-decoy protocols. This
improved key rate for SARG04 is given by [19]
RSARG04 = −Qµf(Eµ)H2(Eµ) +Q1[1−H(Z1|X1)] +Q2[1−H(Z2|X2)]. (44)
The first term is the fraction of EPR pairs spent for bit error correction, the second term
is the contribution to the key rate from the single-photon states, and the third term is the
contribution from the two-photon states. In all our simulations, we found that SARG04
has a smaller key generation rate and a shorter secure distance than BB84, using the com-
bined GLLP and decoy formulation. Our results apply to the case where Eve performs the
most general attack. This situation is different from that in [22], where they assumed that
Eve performs an individual attack. We have shown that optimal mean photon number for
SARG04 can be higher than that of BB84 for small misalignment errors in the detectors.
Also, we observed that the optimal µ for SARG04 and BB84 is approximately constant for a
large of distances. This means that the key generation rates for both of SARG04 and BB84
increase linearly with the transmission efficiency η.
It is interesting to generalize our formulation of SARG04 with infinite decoys to the case
of finite decoys, and to the case of using two-way classical communications with decoy. Also,
our work can be extended to generalizations of SARG04, the six-state SARG04 [19] and the
N -state protocol [23]. We leave them for future studies.
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APPENDIX A: DENSITY MATRICES OF ONE- AND TWO-PHOTON SARG04
1. One-photon case
We consider the most general attack by Eve on all qubits sent by Alice. We focus on
the density matrix of one qubit, denoted as ρqubit, which is obtained by tracing out all
other qubits. Alice initially prepares |Ψ〉AB = (|0z〉A |ϕ0〉B + |1z〉A |ϕ1〉B)/
√
2 and applies
a random rotation, Rk, on system B. After Eve’s attack and Bob’s inverse rotation and
successful filtering, the final qubit pair state for a particular pair is
ρqubit =
3∑
k=0
∑
f
P ((FR−kE(f)Rk)B |Ψ〉AB) (A1)
where P (|Φ〉) = |Φ〉 〈Φ| is a projection operator associated with a pure state |Φ〉, and E(f)
is an arbitrary matrix indexed by f that includes Eve’s action on this qubit. Note that E(f)
can be dependent on Eve’s action on all the other pairs. For the moment, we consider the
case that there is only one action by Eve (i.e. f takes on one value). The (unnormalized)
probability of X, Y , and Z errors on ρqubit due to E can be explicitly computed using Eq. (2)
as follows:
pI =
1
2
|a11 + a22|2 (A2)
pX =
1
4
(|a12 + a21|2 + |a11 − a22|2) (A3)
pY =
1
4
((5a12 − 3a21)a∗12 + (−3a12 + 5a21)a∗21 + |a11 − a22|2) (A4)
pZ = (|a12|2 + |a21|2) + 1
2
(|a11 − a22|2) (A5)
where E =

a11 a12
a21 a22

. The bit error probability is pbit = pX + pY and the phase error
probability is pphase = pZ + pY . It can easily be shown that
pphase =
3
2
pbit (A6)
pY = pbit/2 + |a12 − a21|2/2 (A7)
Note that the above equations involve the error probabilities of the particular pair conditioned
on any configurations of the events including X, Y , and Z errors for all the other pairs, but
not the actual error rate of a realization of the protocol. In an actual protocol, the actual
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bit error rate eb is estimated and we want to relate it to the actual phase error rate ep and
also to the actual Y error rate a (which is the counterpart of pY ). However, we may not
immediately conclude that ep =
3
2
eb and a ≥ eb/2 since pI/X/Y/Z are only the probabilities
of errors conditional on the events for other pairs; the errors of all the EPR pairs could be
arbitrarily correlated. Nevertheless, both ep =
3
2
eb and a ≥ eb/2 can be justified by using
Azuma’s inequality [34]. Let N be the number of EPR pairs, L = {I,X, Y, Z} be a label
for a Pauli operator, n
(l)
L , l ∈ [1, N ] be the actual number of L errors on the first l − 1
pairs, and p
(l)
L be the probability of having an L error on the l
th pair conditional on any
configuration of the events including the actual X/Y/Z error patterns on the first l−1 pairs.
Note that we can identify p
(l)
L to pL. Applying Azuma’s inequality to the random variable
nNL −
∑N
l=1 p
(l)
L , one can show that
∑N
l=1 p
(l)
L → nNL with exponentially increasing probability
as N increases. Thus, after the bit error rate estimation, Alice and Bob perceive that
fractions eb − a, 3eb/2− a, and a of EPR pairs suffer from X, Z, and Y errors respectively.
They can associate this information with a density matrix to arrive at Eq. (9). A similar
security analysis can be found in [35].
2. Two-photon case
In the two-photon case, Alice prepares a three-photon system |Ψ〉ABE1 =
(|0z〉A |ϕ0〉B |ϕ0〉E1 + |1z〉A |ϕ1〉B |ϕ1〉E1)/
√
2 and applies a random rotation, Rk ⊗ Rk, on
systems B and E1. System B is sent to Bob through Eve while system E1 is kept by Eve.
We analyze this case in the same as in the one-photon case. We obtain ρqubit by tracing
out all other EPR pairs and system E1 of the pair under consideration and we arrive at
ep ≤ xeb + g(x), ∀x, where g(x) = 16(3− 2x+
√
6− 6√2x+ 4x2). In this case, we could not
find any constraint on the actual fraction of Y errors, a. This means eb ≥ a ≥ 0.
APPENDIX B: PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Given two initial states (pXα, pYα, pZα) = (eb − aα, aα, ξeb − aα) and (pXβ , pYβ , pZβ) =
(eb−aβ , aβ, ξeb−aβ) where aβ > aα, we apply the same sequence of B/P steps starting with
a B step to the two initial states, thus giving rise to two sequences of states (the α sequence
and the β sequence). We want to show that the final state of the α sequence leads to a
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smaller key generation rate in Eq. (33) than that of the β sequence. This implies that the
key generation rate is an increasing function of a.
Starting with a pool of EPR pairs with state (pX , pY , pZ), applying a B step leads to
a smaller set of surviving pairs with a new state (p′X , p
′
Y , p
′
Z) described by Eqs. (22)-(25).
Similarly, beginning with (pX , pY , pZ), a P step leads to a new state described by Eqs. (26)-
(29).
We apply a change of variables:
tZ = pX + pY (B1)
tX = pY + pZ (B2)
∆ = pZ − pY . (B3)
We start with the hypothesis that in any stage of the α and β sequences, tZβ = tZα , tXβ ≤
tXα , and ∆β ≤ ∆α. If this is true and if tXα ≤ 12 , the key generation rate, 1−H2(tZ)−H2(tX),
at any stage of the α sequence is smaller and Theorem 3 follows.
First, we can verify that the hypothesis is true initially by noticing that tZβ = tZα = eb,
tXβ = tXα = ξeb and ∆β = ξeb − 2aβ < ∆α = ξeb − 2aα.
Next, we show that given the hypothesis is true for the current stage, it is also true for
the next stage when a B step is applied. In the new variables, the new state after a B step
becomes
t′Z = t
2
Z/pS (B4)
t′X = [tX − t2X +∆(1− 2tZ −∆)]/pS (B5)
∆′ = [tX(1− 2tZ) + ∆(1− 2tX)]/pS (B6)
pS = 1− 2tZ + 2t2Z . (B7)
Given that tXβ ≤ tXα and ∆β ≤ ∆α, we express the state of sequence β in terms of that of
sequence α:
t′Zβ = t
′
Zα (B8)
t′Xβ = t
′
Xα − [tXα−β(1− 2tXα + tXα−β) + ∆α−β(1− 2tZβ −∆α −∆β)]/pS (B9)
∆′β = ∆
′
α − [tXα−β(1− 2tZβ − 2∆β) + ∆α−β(1− 2tXα)]/pS (B10)
pS = 1− 2tZ + 2t2Z , (B11)
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where tXα−β = tXα − tXβ ≥ 0 and ∆α−β = ∆α −∆β ≥ 0. Obviously, the hypothesis for the
primed variables is true if (1− 2tZ − 2∆) ≥ 0, tX ≤ 12 , and tZ ≤ 12 at any stage of the α and
β sequence. We will show the first inequality later and impose the last two inequalities as
condition (ii) of the theorem.
We consider the new state after a P step is applied and show that the hypothesis is also
true for this new state. The new state after a P step is
t′Z = 3tZ(1− tZ)2 + t3Z (B12)
t′X = 3t
2
X(1− tX) + t3X (B13)
∆′ = 3∆2(1− 2tZ −∆) +∆3. (B14)
It is obvious that t′X increases with tX , which implies that t
′
Xβ
≤ t′Xα . Also, ∆′ increases
with ∆ provided that (1− 2tZ −∆) ≥ 0 and ∆ ≥ 0, which implies that ∆′β ≤ ∆′α. The first
inequality is satisfied if (1− 2tZ − 2∆) ≥ 0, which will be shown later. We first show that
∆ ≥ 0.
Claim 1. After the initial B step, or after any B/P step that follows, ∆ ≥ 0 holds.
Proof. Before the initial B step is applied, we have
∆ = ξeb − 2a (B15)
≥ ξeb − 2eb (B16)
≥ −eb, (B17)
where the last inequality is due to ξ ≥ 1. After the initial B step, from Eq. (B6), we have
∆′ ≥ 0 if the following condition is satisfied:
∆ ≥ −ξeb(1− 2eb)
1− 2ξeb . (B18)
Since the right-hand side is smaller than −eb, this condition is satisfied after the first B step,
which means that ∆′ ≥ 0 after the first B step. Furthermore, from Eq. (B6) and Eq. (B14),
we conclude that ∆′ ≥ 0 after any B step or P step following the initial B step.
Claim 2. 1 − 2tZ − 2∆ ≥ 0 always holds if eb ≤ 1+4a2(1+ξ) (which is condition (i) of the
Theorem).
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Proof. Before the initial B step, we can easily see
1− 2tZ − 2∆ = 1− 2(1 + ξ)eb + 4a ≥ 0 (B19)
because eb ≤ 1+4a2(1+ξ) . After a B step,
1− 2t′Z − 2∆′ = 1− [2t2Z + 2tX(1− 2tZ) + 2∆(1− 2tX)]/pS (B20)
= (1− 2tZ − 2∆)(1− 2tX)/pS, (B21)
which is non-negative when 1− 2tZ − 2∆ ≥ 0.
After a P step,
1− 2t′Z = (1− 2tZ)3 (B22)
so
1− 2t′Z − 2∆′ = (1− 2tZ)3 − 6∆2(1− 2tZ) + 4∆3 (B23)
= (1− 2tZ − 2∆)[(1− 2tZ)2 + 2∆(1− 2tZ −∆)]. (B24)
which is non-negative when 1− 2tZ − 2∆ ≥ 0 and ∆ ≥ 0.
APPENDIX C: PROOF OF THEOREM 4 AND THEOREM 5
In this appendix, we will prove that a general POVM attack by Eve induces a bit error
rate of at least 1
3
for the single-photon case. To do this, we will first consider a special case
of this attack where Eve always sends only SARG04 states to Bob. Then building on the
proof of this special case, we will show that the minimum bit error rate is 1
3
for the general
POVM attack where Eve sends arbitrary states to Bob. At last, we will generalize the proof
to the case of two photons, showing that it is possible to derive the minimum bit error rate
even for this case.
Before we begin, we note that R4 = I. This allows us to adopt the following notation:
|ϕm+k〉 = R−m |ϕk〉 , ∀m, k ∈ Z (C1)
where the subscripts of the SARG04 states are taken in module 4.
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FIG. 10: A POVM attack by Eve realized by UBE1E2 .
1. Eve sending SARG04 states
A block diagram showing an attack by Eve is depicted in Fig. 10. First, Alice prepares
a bipartite entangled state |Ψ〉AE1 = |0z〉A |ϕ0〉E1 + |1z〉A |ϕ1〉E1. After randomly applying a
rotation Rk, she sends the E1 qubit to Eve, who will then perform a POVM {W †mWm} on
E1, which is realized by an unitary operator UBE1E2 . When the measurement result is m,
Eve sends a state |ϕm〉B to Bob. We will obtain the density matrix of Alice and Bob ρAB
and minimize the bit error rate [Tr(ρAB)]
−1[〈Ψ+| ρAB |Ψ+〉+ 〈Ψ−| ρAB |Ψ−〉] over Wm’s.
The input state transforms as follows:
∑
k
(IA ⊗ RkE1) |Ψ〉AE1 |k〉K (C2)
U−→
∑
k
3∑
m=0
(IA ⊗ (WmRk)E1) |Ψ〉AE1 |m〉E2 |ϕm〉B |k〉K (C3)
R−kF−−−→
∑
k
3∑
m=0
[ |0z〉A (WmRk |ϕ0〉E1) + |1z〉A (WmRk |ϕ1〉E1)]⊗ (C4)
|m〉E2 (FR−k |ϕm〉B) |k〉K
We then trace out systems E1, E2, and K to get the final density matrix between Alice and
Bob:
ρAB =
3∑
k=0
3∑
m=0
(
a00mk |0z〉A 〈0z|+ a01mk |0z〉A 〈1z|+ a10mk |1z〉A 〈0z|+ a11mk |1z〉A 〈1z|
)
(C5)
⊗F |ϕm+k〉B 〈ϕm+k|F † (C6)
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where
a00mk = | 〈0z|Wm |ϕ−k〉 |2 + | 〈1z|Wm |ϕ−k〉 |2 (C7)
a01mk = 〈0z|Wm |ϕ−k〉 〈0z|Wm |ϕ1−k〉∗ + 〈1z|Wm |ϕ−k〉 〈1z|Wm |ϕ1−k〉∗ (C8)
a10mk = (a
01
mk)
∗ (C9)
a11mk = | 〈0z|Wm |ϕ1−k〉 |2 + | 〈1z|Wm |ϕ1−k〉 |2 (C10)
Here, we have used the notation in Eq. (C1). Note that ρAB is a separable density matrix
as we have explicitly constructed it to be, and because of that, no entanglement exists and
thus no secure key can be distilled. We can compute the unnormalized bit error rate pX+pY
as
pX + pY = AB 〈0z1z| ρAB |0z1z〉AB + AB 〈1z0z| ρAB |1z0z〉AB (C11)
=
∑
k+m=0
a11mk
1
4
+
∑
k+m=1
a00mk
1
4
+
∑
k+m=2
(
a00mk
1
2
+ a11mk
1
4
)
(C12)
+
∑
k+m=3
(
a11mk
1
2
+ a00mk
1
4
)
=
3∑
m=0
1∑
j=0
〈jz|WmLmW †m |jz〉 , (C13)
where
Lm =
1
2
|ϕ1+m〉 〈ϕ1+m|+ |ϕ2+m〉 〈ϕ2+m|+ 1
2
|ϕ3+m〉 〈ϕ3+m| . (C14)
Since Wm is some 2 × 2 matrix (not necessary Hermitian), the problem of finding Wm is
broken into finding two independent 1× 2 vectors 〈0z|Wm and 〈1z|Wm.
In order to normalize the bit error rate, we find
Tr(ρAB) =
∑
i,j∈{0,1}
AB 〈izjz| ρAB |izjz〉AB (C15)
=
3∑
m=0
1∑
j=0
〈jz|WmBmW †m |jz〉 , (C16)
where
Bm =
1
2
|ϕ0+m〉 〈ϕ0+m|+ |ϕ1+m〉 〈ϕ1+m|
+
3
2
|ϕ2+m〉 〈ϕ2+m|+ |ϕ3+m〉 〈ϕ3+m| . (C17)
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Therefore, the normalized bit error rate is
eb =
∑3
m=0
∑1
j=0 〈jz|WmLmW †m |jz〉∑3
m=0
∑1
j=0 〈jz|WmBmW †m |jz〉
(C18)
We want to minimize eb over the eight independent 1 × 2 vectors 〈jz|Wm. At least one of
the eight must be non-zero, otherwise all Wm would be zero and there would be no qubits
sent to Bob. Since eb is not a sum of eight independent ratios, i.e.
eb 6=
3∑
m=0
1∑
j=0
〈jz|WmLmW †m |jz〉
〈jz|WmBmW †m |jz〉
, (C19)
it may appear at first sight that the minimization of eb is not trivial. However, it turns
out that we can minimize each ratio independently and set eb to be the smallest ratio by
assigning zeros to the other seven vectors. We show this by the following claim:
Claim 3. Given two ratios, a1
a2
and b1
b2
, if a1
a2
≤ b1
b2
, then a1
a2
≤ a1+b1
a2+b2
.
Therefore, we consider separately minimizing each ratio, which can be written as
〈cjm|B−
1
2
m LmB
− 1
2
m |cjm〉
〈cjm|cjm〉 (C20)
where 〈cjm| = 〈jz|WmB
1
2
m is a 1 × 2 vector. The minimizing cjm is the eigenvector of
B
− 1
2
m LmB
− 1
2
m corresponding to the minimum eigenvalue. The two eigenvalues are 0.6 and 13
for all m. Thus, the minimum eb is
1
3
. A POVM {W †mWm} that is compatible with these
eigenvectors isW †mWm = |ϕm〉 〈ϕm| /2, m = 0, . . . , 3, which is the trivial intercept-and-resend
attack.
2. Eve sending arbitrary states
Now, instead of sending the four SARG04 states |ϕi〉 , i = 0, . . . , 3, we assume Eve sends
any number, G, of arbitrary states. We label these states as |σg0〉 , g = 0, . . . , G − 1. For
the sake of making the analysis of this case parallel to that of the previous case of sending
SARG04 states, we associate three extra states (with certain symmetry) to each arbitrary
state and we label all states as follows:
|σgi 〉 , i = 0, . . . , 3, g = 0, . . . , G− 1. (C21)
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We can view the states as divided into sets of four with a total of G sets. The i = 0 states are
the original arbitrary states and are called the representative states of its set; the i = 1, 2, 3
states are the extra states introduced. The POVM elements {W gi †W gi } corresponding to the
states are also indexed in the same way. Along the same lines as the SARG04 states, we
define the extra states to have a rotational symmetry that satisfies |σgm+k〉 = R−k |σgm〉 , ∀g.
This symmetry requirement makes the analysis much easier since it resembles the analysis
for the case of sending SARG04 states. Note that the introduction of the three extra states
in each set does not lose any generality, since if the extra states are not needed in the
minimization of the bit error rate, their corresponding POVM elements will eventually be
found to be zeros.
The analysis of this case basically goes as before by replacing |ϕi〉 with |σgi 〉. The final
normalized bit error rate is
eb =
∑G−1
g=0
∑3
m=0
∑1
j=0 〈jz|W gmLgmW gm† |jz〉∑G−1
g=0
∑3
m=0
∑1
j=0 〈jz|W gmBgmW gm† |jz〉
, (C22)
which has the same form as before but with different Lgm’s and B
g
m’s. As before, both of
them are weighted sums of the outer products of the SARG04 states,
∑4
i=1 κim |ϕi+m〉 〈ϕi+m|.
(κim’s for B
g
m and L
g
m are different.) The difference is that now κim’s are no longer constant,
but dependent on the representative state of each set sent by Eve, |σg0〉. Thus, W gm is also a
function of this state. Since Claim 3 says that we can minimize each term of eb separately
and since |σg0〉 is arbitrary anyway, we only need to focus on L00 and B00 and minimize the
eigenvalues of (B00)
− 1
2L00(B
0
0)
− 1
2 (which correspond to the bit error rate). The two eigenvalues
are
2− c
4− c and
2 + c
4 + c
. (C23)
where |σ00〉 , σ00 |0z〉 + σ01 |1z〉, c = |σ
2
00
+σ2
01
|
|σ00|2+|σ01|2 ≤ 1. The minimum of the first eigenvalue
is 1
3
at c = 1 and the second eigenvalue is in [0.5, 0.6]. Therefore, we conclude that, for the
one-photon SARG04 case, the minimum bit error rate caused by Eve using a general POVM
intercept-and-resend attack with arbitrary states sent is 1
3
. Note that c = 1 corresponds
to the phase difference between σ00 and σ01 being 0 or pi, under our specific choice of the
SARG04 states. Also, the bit error rate of 1
3
can be achieved with any assignment of σ00
and σ01 (of course, different assignments of them give rise to different POVM elements), as
long as they are in phase or completely out of phase.
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3. Two-photon case
We can extend this proof to the two-photon SARG04 case easily. The initial state becomes
|Ψ〉AE1 = |0z〉A |ϕ0ϕ0〉E1 + |1z〉A |ϕ1ϕ1〉E1, as Alice emits two photons to Eve. Alice applies
rotation Rk ⊗ Rk to the two-qubit system E1 before it is sent to Eve. Eve then performs a
POVM on E1 and, based on the measurement outcome, sends system B to Bob as before.
The analysis for this case is the same as the one-photon case, with the change of E1 being
a two-qubit system. Because of this change, the matrices W gm, L
g
m, and B
g
m in the analysis
are subsequently changed to have dimension 4 × 4. Both Lgm and Bgm are enlarged by
replacing every tensor product of the form |ϕm〉 〈ϕm| by |ϕmϕm〉 〈ϕmϕm|, with no change
to the corresponding coefficients. We can carry the same analysis as the single-photon case
and arrive at the eigenvalues of (B00)
− 1
2L0(B
0
0)
− 1
2 to determine the bit error rate2. Because
of the increased dimension in this case, we could not directly solve for the eigenvalues in
terms of |σg0〉. Instead, we parameterize the eigenvalues with two parameters, θz, and θy,
and plot the eigenvalues against these two parameters. These two parameters come from
the fact that any state can be written as a rotation about the z-axis on |ϕ0〉 (which is not
equal to |0z〉 or |1z〉) followed a rotation about the y-axis, i.e. |σ00〉 = Ry(θy)Rz(θz) |ϕ0〉.
Using this definition for |σ00〉, we found, from plots of the eigenvalues as functions of θy and
θz, that the eigenvalues are not dependent on θy and reach minimum when θz = 0, pi. The
minimum eigenvalue (and thus the minimum bit error rate) is 3−
√
2
7
≈ 22.65%. A POVM
that gives rise to this minimum bit error rate is
W †mWm = P (λ+ |ϕm〉 |ϕm〉+ λ− |ϕm+2〉 |ϕm+2〉) , m = 0, . . . , 3 (C24)
W †vacWvac = P (|ϕ0〉 |ϕ2〉 − |ϕ2〉 |ϕ0〉)/2 (C25)
= P (|ϕ3〉 |ϕ1〉 − |ϕ1〉 |ϕ3〉)/2 (C26)
where λ± = (±2 +
√
2)/4 and P (|Φ〉) = |Φ〉 〈Φ| is a projection operator associated with a
pure state |Φ〉. Eve sends |ϕm〉 to Bob when the measurement outcome is m ∈ [0, 3]. Note
that W †vacWvac never occurs, since the four states sent by Alice, |ϕm〉 |ϕm〉 , m ∈ [0, 3], are
2 Actually, the pseudo inverse of B0
0
is used since B0
0
(and L0
0
) has rank 3. The analysis is not affected since
the nullspaces of B0
0
and L0
0
are the same.
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orthogonal to the state W †vacWvac projects onto.
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